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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ANNETTE K. BEARDALL
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 16994

v.

NEIL J. BEARDALL,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff and Defendant in this matter are a
divorced couple, and this matter arose out of an Order to Show
Cause brought by the Plaintiff regarding said divorce.

The

Plaintiff requested that the Defendant be required to pay certain
sums of money that the Plaintiff claimed were owed under the
provisions of the Divorce Decree.

Specifically, that Defendant

owed sums of money for payment of medical expenses, payment of
insurance premiums and attorney's fees.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter was tried in the Fourth Judicial District
Court in and for Utah County, Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge,
presiding.

Defendant was found to be owing certain sums of money

and was ordered to pay $285.88 for doctor bills and medical expenses, $73.32 as reimbursement for prescription drugs, $700.00 as
reimbursement for insurance premiums and $125.00 as attorney's fees
for a total Judgment of $1,184.20.

It is from the Judgment for

$700.00 for insurance premiums and the Judgment for $125.00 in
attorney's fees that the Defendant appeals.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the Judgment awarding
$700.00 as reimbursement for insurance premiums and the Judgment awarding $125.00 as attorney's fees.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Annette Knotts, hereinafter referred to as
"Respondent", and Neil J. Beardall, hereinafter referred to
as "Appellant", were married at
on May 5, 1951.

~·Jinnemucca,

State of Nevada,

The marriage was dissolved by a Decree of

Divorce entered on November 22, 1968 in the Fourth Judicial
District Court of Utah County, State of Utah.

The Decree

awarded Respondent custody of two of the couple's four children:
Lisa Ann, then age 8, and Sherrie Kim, then age 3.

Appellant

was awarded custody of Michael Gus, then age 13, and John Neil,
then age 17, and was ordered to pay child support and medical
and dental expenses for the two minor daughters.
The payment of the medical and dental expenses for
the two minor daughters has been a source of much contention
between the parties.

In November of 1975, the Appellant was

ordered to show cause why he should not reimburse Respondent
for monthly group health insurance premiums paid, in part, by
Respondent on behalf of the two daughters.

In a Judgment and

Order dated November 19, 1975, the Fourth Judicial District
Court ruled that the Divorce Decree did not require Appellant
to provide medical insurance for the couple's two minor daughters
and Appellant was found to be not liable for reimbursement of the
premiums paid by Respondent.
stated that:

Judge J. Robert Bullock specifically

"Defendant [is] not found responsible to provide

medical insurance for the two minor daughters of the parties."
-3-
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Despite this Order, the Resuondent continued the
insurance coverage on her two daughters knowing full well that
the Appellant was not liable and that she was voluntarily
making unreimbursable payments for the continued coverage.
On February 6, 1980, a hearing was held before the
Honorable J. Robert Bullock of the Fourth Judicial District
Court on Respondent's Order requiring Appellant to show cause
why he had not paid Respondent's $3,395.24 in medical, hospital
and dental expenses for the parties' two daughters.

In his

Judgment and Order of March 6, 1980, Judge Bullock found, on
Stipulation of the parties, that Respondent had paid $285.88 fc
doctor bills and $73.32 for prescription drugs beyond amounts
collected by Respondent from medical and dental insurance, and
ordered Appellant to reimburse Respondent in those amounts.
Furthermore, Respondent once again asked for reimbursement of
her payments on the group health insurance premiums.
to these insurance premiums, Judge Bullock stated:

In regarc

"

technically I could not award her a Judgment for the insurance
premiums that she has paid under the terms of this Decree or aE
it was amended, could I?" (T 15).

Despite the fact that Judge

Bullock recognized that he had, in 1975, ordered that the
Appellant was not responsible to provide medical insurance,
Judge Bullock found that group health insurance premiums paid
by Respondent amounted to $700.00, and ordered Appellant to
reimburse Respondent in that amount.

Furthermore, Appellant

was ordered to pay $125.00 in attorney's fees, for a total

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Judgment against Appellant of $1,184.20.

From the Judgment

awarding $700.00 for reimbursement of insurance premiums and
$125.00 for attorney's fees, Appellant has taken this appeal.

-5-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE ORDER OF MARCH 6, 1980 REQUIRING APPELLANT TO

REIMBURSE RESPONDENT FOR $700.00 IN MEDICAL INSURANCE IS AN
INVALID DE FACTO MODIFICATION OF THE DIVORCE DECREE INASMUCH
AS THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES.
A Decree of Divorce may be modified as is equitable
to provide for the support and maintenance of the parties.
U.C.A. 30-3-5 (1953) clearly gives the Courts continuing
jurisdiction to make any modifications needed as is reasonable
and necessary.

In the present case, a Divorce Decree was

entered on the 22nd day of November, 1968, wherein the Appella1
was "ordered to pay all medical and dental expense incurred fo:
medical and dental care to the minor daughters of the parties.'
This Decree was properly modified in part on the 19th day of
November, 1975, by an Order of the Fourth Judicial District
Court of Utah County, wherein the Appellant was "found not responsible to provide medical insurance for the two minor <laugh·
of the parties."
The Order of March 6, 1980 by the Court was an inval:
modification of the Divorce Decree inasmuch as the Respondent
failed to show a substantial change of circumstances.

This

Court has clearly stated the proposition that in order to

~ofic

an existing Decree, the moving party must show a substantial
change of circumstances.

Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d

1090, 1091 (Utah 1978);

Smith v. Smith, 564 P.2d 307, (Utah

1977);

Gale v. Gale, 123 Utah 277, 258 P.2d 986 (1953).
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If a showing of changed circumstances is not made,
the decree cannot be modified and the matters previously
litigated and incorporated therein cannot be collaterally
attacked in light of the doctrine of res judicata.
v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090, 1091 (Utah 1978);
McLane, 570 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1977).

Kessimakis

McLane v.

In the case of Searle

Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978), this Court
identified the four requirements for the application of the
doctrine of res judicata,
"l.

·was the issue decided in the prior adjudication
identical with the one presented in the action
in question?

2.

Was there a final judgment on the merits?

3.

Was the party against whom the plea is asserted
a party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication?

4.

Was the issue in the first case competently,
fully and fairly litigated?"

(588 P.2d at 691)
This Court further stated that:
"In general, a divorce decree, like other final judgments, is conclusive as to parties a.nd their nrivies
and operates as a bar to any subsequent action.
In
order for res judicata to apply, both suits must involve the same parties or their privies and also the
same cause of action; and this precludes the relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated as
well as those that were, in fact, litigated in the
prior action."
(588 P.2d at 690)
In this case, there was no finding of a substantial
change of circtnnstances between November, 1975 and March, 1980
to warrant a modification of the Decree that the Appellant is
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not responsible for medical insurance for the two minor
daughters.

Furthermore, the Respondent made no showing of

a substantial change in the circumstances so as to warrant
a modification of the Divorce Decree.
The two suits dated respectively November, 1975
and March, 1980, involved the same parties and the same cause
of action.

The four requirements for applying the dictrine

of res judicata have been clearly fulfilled.

Inasmuch as

the Respondent failed to show a substantial change of circumstances, the Order of November, 1975 should be res judicata
on the issue of whether the Appellant is liable for the medica
insurance premiums.

-8-
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POINT II. THE ORDER OF MARCH 6, 1980, REQUIRING APPELLANT
TO REIMBURSE RESPONDENT FOR $700.00 IN MEDICAL INSURANCE
PREMIUMS IS AN INVALID DE FACTO MODIFICATION OF THE DIVORCE
DECREE SINCE IT IS RETROACTIVE, NOT PROSPECTIVE, IN EFFECT.
Even if there has been a showing of a substantial
change in circumstances, which would justify a modification of
the Decree, such a modification cannot be

a~plied

retroactively.

In Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077 (Utah 1977), this Court
affirmed the lower Court's dismissal of a Motion for retroactive
support, stating:

"In this jurisdiction, alimony and support

payments become unalterable debts as they accrue; therefore, a
periodic installment cannot be changed or modified after the
installments have become due.

II

(561 P.2d at 1079).

Whitaker v. l'lhitaker, 551 P.2d 226 (Utah 1976);
19 Utah 2d 267, 430 P.2d 580 (1976).

Also, see

Scott v. Scott,

If the Respondent dis-

agreed with the November, 1975 Order that the Appellant was not
liable for providing health insurance for the couple's two
daughters, she should have filed an appeal with this Court.
Instead, she incurred these insurance expenses voluntarily for
a period of three years and now seeks reimbursement from the
Appellant for an expense which the November, 1975 Order clearly
identified as an item for which the Appellant was not liable.
The trial Judge stated:
"I'm no~ saying anything except that technically I
couldn t award her a Judgment for the insurance
premiums that she's paid under the terms of this
Decree or as it was amended, could I?"
(T. 15).
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The Judge recognized that he could not make the
modification apply retroactively, yet he still awarded judgment against the Appellant in the sum of $700.00 as reimbursement for insurance premiums.

This Order is an invalid

retroactive application of the modification.
The $700.00 judgment for reimbursement for insurance
premiums against the Appellant should be set aside in that
there was no showing of changed circumstances by the Responden
to justify modification, and, even if there were, the modifica
tion cannot be applied retroactively.

-10-
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POINT III.

THE AlMRD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE RESPONDENT

IN THE PRESENT CASE WAS IMPROPER.
A.

THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN AWARDING

RESPONDENT ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d)(l) and
U.C.A. 30-3-5

(1953) allow an award of costs and attorney's

fees to be made in domestic relations cases.

In the recent

case of Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 1979), this Court
stated that the award of attorney's fees in a show cause hearing
or divorce matter is within the sound discretion of the trial
Court.

However, in the most recent case of Kerr v. Kerr, #16495,

- - - - P.2d

(Utah 1980), this Court held that an award

of attorney's fees must be based on evidence of need and
reasonableness.

This Court set forth that the evidence of need

and reasonableness must be produced at the trial.
In the case presently before the Court, as in the
Kerr case, no evidence as to reasonableness of the attorney's
fees or as to the need was presented.
was shown.

In fact, the contrary

As is evidenced by the financial declaration re-

ceived in evidence by the trial Court, and the stipulated facts,
the Appellant is in far worse financial condition than the
Respondent.

The award of attorney's fees, then, must be reversed

on two counts.

The first being that the Respondent failed to

introduce any evidence that the amount awarded was reasonable
under the circumstances.

The second count is that there was no

evidence whatsoever to support the finding by the trial Judge
-11-
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that the Respondent should receive the attorney's fee because
of her financial situation.

The lack of evidence on both thes1

counts clearly indicates that this Court should reverse the
award of attorney's fees.
B.

AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WHICH IS UNRELATED TO THE

OUTCOME OF THE LAWSUIT HAS A SIGNIFICANT CHILLING EFFECT ON THJ .
PARTY'S FOURTEENTH AMElIDMENT RIGHTS TO ::>UE PROCESS.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees a person the right to due process of the law
This has been interpreted many times to include the right to a
hearing.

In the present situation, the Respondent asserted a

claim against the Appellant.

The Appellant felt that the

cla~

was substantially in excess of any claims that Respondent may
have had against him.

As such, he felt it necessary to exerci

his Fourteenth Amendment right to due urocess and requested a
hearing.

At that hearing, the Appellant asserted a good faith

defense against the claims of the Respondent.

In fact, he

substantially prevailed in those claims against the Respondent
As such, an award of attorney's fees in this case constitutes
a punishment against the Appellant for exercising his right to
due process.

If this Court were to uphold the award of

attorney's fees in this case, it would create an atmosphere
whereby a person with a good faith defense may refrain from
asserting that defense in fear of receiving a greater judgment
for attorney's fees.
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A~

C.

AWARD OF ATTQ"Q_NEY' S FEES AGAINST A PARTY THAT

IS IMPECUNIOUS UNDER U.C.A. 21-7-3, 4 (1953) EFFECTIVELY

DENIES THAT PARTY HIS RIGHTS UNDER THAT STATUTE.
U.C.A. 21-7-3 (1953) allows a party to declare that
he is impecunious.

Furthermore, U.C.A. 21-7-4 (1953) grants

to a party who is impecunious access to the legal system
without prejudice because of his financial condition.

Public

policy demands that all, even the poor, should have access to
justice.

The above-mentioned statutory pronouncements reflect

this public policy by removing the cost barriers to the judicial
system.

The Affidavit required under the statute must show that

the individual filing the .Affidavit meets two criteria.
first being that he/she is in fact impecunious.

The

The second

being that the individual, in good faith, believes that he/she
is entitled to the relief sought.

In the present case, there were

no findings by the trial Judge that either the Defendant was
not impecunious or that his defense was not in good faith.

In

fact, the defense must have been in good faith in that the
amount received by the Resµondent was approximately one-third
of the amount requested.

That one-third, in fact, reflects the

questionable $700.00 Judgment for reimbursement of insurance
expenses.
If an impecunious party knows that even if he presents
a good faith defense and substantially prevails, a Judgment for
attorney's fees will likely be entered

a~ainst

him, his access

to the legal process is substantially threatened.

In the present
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case, the Appellant presented a good faith defense and
substantially prevailed, but still a Judgment for attorney's
fees was entered against him.

Such an award of attorney's

fees is contrary to public policy manifested by the legislativE
enactment of U.C.A. 21-7-4 (1953).

A better rule for the

judiciary would be to award attorney's fees against

impecuniou~:

defendants only when they present a frivolous defense, without
basis in fact or law, and that such a determination is made at
the time of trial.

-14-
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~
t

CONCLUSION
Prior to a divorce decree being properly modified,
the party requesting such a modification must present evidence
of a substantial change in circumstances.

Unless the party does

so, the doctrine of res judicata applies and the modification
cannot be made.

In this case, there was no evidence of a sub-

stantial change in circumstances; therefore, any modification
was improper.
Even if the Respondent in this case had presented
evidence of a substantial change in circumstances, the case
law is clear that a modification cannot be applied retroactively.
The Respondent was requesting that the trial Court order the
Appellant to reimburse her for medical insurance premiums.

The

trial Court, in an earlier ruling, stated that the Appellant
was not required to pay said premiums.

The de facto modifica-

tion made by the trial Court was, in effect, applied retroactively
and was improper.
While it is true that the trial Court has broad
discretion in the awarding of attorney's fees, the award must
be based on reasonableness and need.

It is clear from the

record in this case that the Respondent failed to introduce any
evidence whatsoever, as to the reasonableness of the fee.

The

evidence of need shows that the Appellant is more in need
financially than the Respondent.

-15-
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A holding under the circumstances of this case, that
the award of attorney's fees was proper, would have a significa1
chilling effect on the Appellant's rights to due process.

The

Appellant also presented evidence that he was, in fact, impecun
under the State Impecuniosity Statutes.

As such, the award of

attorney's fees in this case flies in the face of the public
policy enunciated under the State Impecuniosity Statutes and mu
be reversed.
Wherefore, the Judgment awarding the Respondent $700.
for reimbursement of insurance premiums and $125.00 for attorne
fees, should hereby be reversed.
DATED this

/£

day of

/

~

, 1980.

Respectfully submitted,
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
By P. Gary Ferrero
105 South 100 East
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorney for Appellant
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